0aed907a86
This minor release includes 10 security fixes following the security policy:
- net/mail: excessive CPU consumption in ParseAddress
The ParseAddress function constructed domain-literal address components through repeated string concatenation. When parsing large domain-literal components, this could cause excessive CPU consumption.
Thanks to Philippe Antoine (Catena cyber) for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2025-61725 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/75680.
- crypto/x509: quadratic complexity when checking name constraints
Due to the design of the name constraint checking algorithm, the processing time
of some inputs scales non-linearly with respect to the size of the certificate.
This affects programs which validate arbitrary certificate chains.
Thanks to Jakub Ciolek for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2025-58187 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/75681.
- crypto/tls: ALPN negotiation errors can contain arbitrary text
The crypto/tls conn.Handshake method returns an error on the server-side when
ALPN negotation fails which can contain arbitrary attacker controlled
information provided by the client-side of the connection which is not escaped.
This affects programs which log these errors without any additional form of
sanitization, and may allow injection of attacker controlled information into
logs.
Thanks to National Cyber Security Centre Finland for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2025-58189 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/75652.
- encoding/pem: quadratic complexity when parsing some invalid inputs
Due to the design of the PEM parsing function, the processing time for some
inputs scales non-linearly with respect to the size of the input.
This affects programs which parse untrusted PEM inputs.
Thanks to Jakub Ciolek for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2025-61723 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/75676.
- net/url: insufficient validation of bracketed IPv6 hostnames
The Parse function permitted values other than IPv6 addresses to be included in square brackets within the host component of a URL. RFC 3986 permits IPv6 addresses to be included within the host component, enclosed within square brackets. For example: "http://[::1]/". IPv4 addresses and hostnames must not appear within square brackets. Parse did not enforce this requirement.
Thanks to Enze Wang, Jingcheng Yang and Zehui Miao of Tsinghua University for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2025-47912 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/75678.
- encoding/asn1: pre-allocating memory when parsing DER payload can cause memory exhaustion
When parsing DER payloads, memories were being allocated prior to fully validating the payloads.
This permits an attacker to craft a big empty DER payload to cause memory exhaustion in functions such as asn1.Unmarshal, x509.ParseCertificateRequest, and ocsp.ParseResponse.
Thanks to Jakub Ciolek for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2025-58185 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/75671.
- net/http: lack of limit when parsing cookies can cause memory exhaustion
Despite HTTP headers having a default limit of 1 MB, the number of cookies that can be parsed did not have a limit.
By sending a lot of very small cookies such as "a=;", an attacker can make an HTTP server allocate a large amount of structs, causing large memory consumption.
net/http now limits the number of cookies accepted to 3000, which can be adjusted using the httpcookiemaxnum GODEBUG option.
Thanks to jub0bs for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2025-58186 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/75672.
- crypto/x509: panic when validating certificates with DSA public keys
Validating certificate chains which contain DSA public keys can cause programs
to panic, due to a interface cast that assumes they implement the Equal method.
This affects programs which validate arbitrary certificate chains.
Thanks to Jakub Ciolek for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2025-58188 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/75675.
- archive/tar: unbounded allocation when parsing GNU sparse map
tar.Reader did not set a maximum size on the number of sparse region data blocks in GNU tar pax 1.0 sparse files. A maliciously-crafted archive containing a large number of sparse regions could cause a Reader to read an unbounded amount of data from the archive into memory. When reading from a compressed source, a small compressed input could result in large allocations.
Thanks to Harshit Gupta (Mr HAX) - https://www.linkedin.com/in/iam-harshit-gupta/ for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2025-58183 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/75677.
- net/textproto: excessive CPU consumption in Reader.ReadResponse
The Reader.ReadResponse function constructed a response string through
repeated string concatenation of lines. When the number of lines in a response is large,
this could cause excessive CPU consumption.
Thanks to Jakub Ciolek for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2025-61724 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/75716.
Signed-off-by: Paweł Gronowski <pawel.gronowski@docker.com>
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