This was using `errors.Wrap` when there was no error to wrap, meanwhile
we are supposed to be creating a new error.
Found this while investigating some log corruption issues and
unexpectedly getting a nil reader and a nil error from `getTailReader`.
Signed-off-by: Brian Goff <cpuguy83@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0a48d26fbc)
Signed-off-by: Paweł Gronowski <pawel.gronowski@docker.com>
With both rootless and live restore enabled, there's some race condition
which causes the container to be `Unmount`ed before the refcount is
restored.
This makes sure we don't underflow the refcount (uint64) when
decrementing it.
The root cause of this race condition still needs to be investigated and
fixed, but at least this unflakies the `TestLiveRestore`.
Signed-off-by: Paweł Gronowski <pawel.gronowski@docker.com>
(cherry picked from commit 294fc9762e)
Signed-off-by: Paweł Gronowski <pawel.gronowski@docker.com>
When this was called concurrently from the moby image
exporter there could be a data race where a layer was
written to the refs map when it was already there.
In that case the reference count got mixed up and on
release only one of these layers was actually released.
Signed-off-by: Tonis Tiigi <tonistiigi@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 37545cc644)
Signed-off-by: Paweł Gronowski <pawel.gronowski@docker.com>
In de2447c, the creation of the 'lower' file was changed from using
os.Create to using ioutils.AtomicWriteFile, which ignores the system's
umask. This means that even though the requested permission in the
source code was always 0666, it was 0644 on systems with default
umask of 0022 prior to de2447c, so the move to AtomicFile potentially
increased the file's permissions.
This is not a security issue because the parent directory does not
allow writes into the file, but it can confuse security scanners on
Linux-based systems into giving false positives.
Signed-off-by: Jaroslav Jindrak <dzejrou@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit cadb124ab6)
Signed-off-by: Paweł Gronowski <pawel.gronowski@docker.com>
The platform comparison was backported from the branch that vendors
containerd 1.7.
In this branch the vendored containerd version is older and doesn't have
the same comparison logic for Windows specific OSVersion.
Require both major and minor components of Windows OSVersion to match.
Signed-off-by: Paweł Gronowski <pawel.gronowski@docker.com>
Add this syscall to match the profile in containerd
containerd: a6e52c74fa
libseccomp: 53267af3fb
kernel: 9f6c532f59
futex: Add sys_futex_wake()
To complement sys_futex_waitv() add sys_futex_wake(). This syscall
implements what was previously known as FUTEX_WAKE_BITSET except it
uses 'unsigned long' for the bitmask and takes FUTEX2 flags.
The 'unsigned long' allows FUTEX2_SIZE_U64 on 64bit platforms.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit d69729e053)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Add this syscall to match the profile in containerd
containerd: a6e52c74fa
libseccomp: 53267af3fb
kernel: cb8c4312af
futex: Add sys_futex_wait()
To complement sys_futex_waitv()/wake(), add sys_futex_wait(). This
syscall implements what was previously known as FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET
except it uses 'unsigned long' for the value and bitmask arguments,
takes timespec and clockid_t arguments for the absolute timeout and
uses FUTEX2 flags.
The 'unsigned long' allows FUTEX2_SIZE_U64 on 64bit platforms.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 10d344d176)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Add this syscall to match the profile in containerd
containerd: a6e52c74fa
libseccomp: 53267af3fb
kernel: 0f4b5f9722
futex: Add sys_futex_requeue()
Finish off the 'simple' futex2 syscall group by adding
sys_futex_requeue(). Unlike sys_futex_{wait,wake}() its arguments are
too numerous to fit into a regular syscall. As such, use struct
futex_waitv to pass the 'source' and 'destination' futexes to the
syscall.
This syscall implements what was previously known as FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE
and uses {val, uaddr, flags} for source and {uaddr, flags} for
destination.
This design explicitly allows requeueing between different types of
futex by having a different flags word per uaddr.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit df57a080b6)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Add this syscall to match the profile in containerd
containerd: a6e52c74fa
libseccomp: 53267af3fb
kernel: c35559f94e
x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall
When operating with shadow stacks enabled, the kernel will automatically
allocate shadow stacks for new threads, however in some cases userspace
will need additional shadow stacks. The main example of this is the
ucontext family of functions, which require userspace allocating and
pivoting to userspace managed stacks.
Unlike most other user memory permissions, shadow stacks need to be
provisioned with special data in order to be useful. They need to be setup
with a restore token so that userspace can pivot to them via the RSTORSSP
instruction. But, the security design of shadow stacks is that they
should not be written to except in limited circumstances. This presents a
problem for userspace, as to how userspace can provision this special
data, without allowing for the shadow stack to be generally writable.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 8826f402f9)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Add this syscall to match the profile in containerd
containerd: a6e52c74fa
libseccomp: 53267af3fb
kernel: 09da082b07
fs: Add fchmodat2()
On the userspace side fchmodat(3) is implemented as a wrapper
function which implements the POSIX-specified interface. This
interface differs from the underlying kernel system call, which does not
have a flags argument. Most implementations require procfs [1][2].
There doesn't appear to be a good userspace workaround for this issue
but the implementation in the kernel is pretty straight-forward.
The new fchmodat2() syscall allows to pass the AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW flag,
unlike existing fchmodat.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 6f242f1a28)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Add this syscall to match the profile in containerd
containerd: a6e52c74fa
libseccomp: 53267af3fb
kernel: cf264e1329
NAME
cachestat - query the page cache statistics of a file.
SYNOPSIS
#include <sys/mman.h>
struct cachestat_range {
__u64 off;
__u64 len;
};
struct cachestat {
__u64 nr_cache;
__u64 nr_dirty;
__u64 nr_writeback;
__u64 nr_evicted;
__u64 nr_recently_evicted;
};
int cachestat(unsigned int fd, struct cachestat_range *cstat_range,
struct cachestat *cstat, unsigned int flags);
DESCRIPTION
cachestat() queries the number of cached pages, number of dirty
pages, number of pages marked for writeback, number of evicted
pages, number of recently evicted pages, in the bytes range given by
`off` and `len`.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 4d0d5ee10d)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
This syscall is gated by CAP_SYS_NICE, matching the profile in containerd.
containerd: a6e52c74fa
libseccomp: d83cb7ac25
kernel: c6018b4b25
mm/mempolicy: add set_mempolicy_home_node syscall
This syscall can be used to set a home node for the MPOL_BIND and
MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY memory policy. Users should use this syscall after
setting up a memory policy for the specified range as shown below.
mbind(p, nr_pages * page_size, MPOL_BIND, new_nodes->maskp,
new_nodes->size + 1, 0);
sys_set_mempolicy_home_node((unsigned long)p, nr_pages * page_size,
home_node, 0);
The syscall allows specifying a home node/preferred node from which
kernel will fulfill memory allocation requests first.
...
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 1251982cf7)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
The compatibility depends on whether `hyperv` or `process` container
isolation is used.
This fixes cache not being used when building images based on older
Windows versions on a newer Windows host.
Signed-off-by: Paweł Gronowski <pawel.gronowski@docker.com>
(cherry picked from commit 91ea04089b)
Signed-off-by: Paweł Gronowski <pawel.gronowski@docker.com>
Only print the tag when the received reference has a tag, if
we can't cast the received tag to a `reference.Tagged` then
skip printing the tag as it's likely a digest.
Fixes panic when trying to install a plugin from a reference
with a digest such as
`vieux/sshfs@sha256:1d3c3e42c12138da5ef7873b97f7f32cf99fb6edde75fa4f0bcf9ed277855811`
Signed-off-by: Laura Brehm <laurabrehm@hey.com>
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Adds a test case for installing a plugin from a remote in the form
of `plugin-content-trust@sha256:d98f2f8061...`, which is currently
causing the daemon to panic, as we found while running the CLI e2e
tests:
```
docker plugin install registry:5000/plugin-content-trust@sha256:d98f2f806144bf4ba62d4ecaf78fec2f2fe350df5a001f6e3b491c393326aedb
```
Signed-off-by: Laura Brehm <laurabrehm@hey.com>
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
The monitorDaemon() goroutine calls startContainerd() then blocks on
<-daemonWaitCh to wait for it to exit. The startContainerd() function
would (re)initialize the daemonWaitCh so a restarted containerd could be
waited on. This implementation was race-free because startContainerd()
would synchronously initialize the daemonWaitCh before returning. When
the call to start the managed containerd process was moved into the
waiter goroutine, the code to initialize the daemonWaitCh struct field
was also moved into the goroutine. This introduced a race condition.
Move the daemonWaitCh initialization to guarantee that it happens before
the startContainerd() call returns.
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
(cherry picked from commit dd20bf4862)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
2024-02-03 11:41:08 +01:00
17 changed files with 334 additions and 27 deletions
logger.Debug("MountPoint.Cleanup Decrement active count")
ifm.active==0{
m.ID=""
}
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