From bda87b7de87be2bea500b5fe0afde2fb38e99b88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sebastiaan van Stijn Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2025 14:33:21 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] vendor: golang.org/x/crypto v0.45.0 full diff: https://github.com/golang/crypto/compare/v0.44.0...v0.45.0 Hello gophers, We have tagged version v0.45.0 of golang.org/x/crypto in order to address two security issues. This version fixes a vulnerability in the golang.org/x/crypto/ssh package and a vulnerability in the golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent package which could cause programs to consume unbounded memory or panic respectively. SSH servers parsing GSSAPI authentication requests don't validate the number of mechanisms specified in the request, allowing an attacker to cause unbounded memory consumption. Thanks to Jakub Ciolek for reporting this issue. This is CVE-2025-58181 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/76363. SSH Agent servers do not validate the size of messages when processing new identity requests, which may cause the program to panic if the message is malformed due to an out of bounds read. Thanks to Jakub Ciolek for reporting this issue. This is CVE-2025-47914 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/76364. Cheers, Go Security team Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn --- go.mod | 2 +- go.sum | 4 +- vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go | 1 + vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/ssh_gss.go | 8 +- vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/streamlocal.go | 4 +- vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/tcpip.go | 124 +++++++++++------- vendor/modules.txt | 2 +- 7 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) diff --git a/go.mod b/go.mod index c679800bd7..27e5bab9b7 100644 --- a/go.mod +++ b/go.mod @@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ require ( go.uber.org/multierr v1.11.0 // indirect go.uber.org/zap v1.27.0 // indirect go.yaml.in/yaml/v2 v2.4.3 // indirect - golang.org/x/crypto v0.44.0 // indirect + golang.org/x/crypto v0.45.0 // indirect golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.30.0 // indirect golang.org/x/tools v0.38.0 // indirect google.golang.org/api v0.248.0 // indirect diff --git a/go.sum b/go.sum index ab832c501e..d5e584e0f2 100644 --- a/go.sum +++ b/go.sum @@ -706,8 +706,8 @@ golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190923035154-9ee001bba392/go.mod h1:/lpIB1dKB+9EgE3 golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20191011191535-87dc89f01550/go.mod h1:yigFU9vqHzYiE8UmvKecakEJjdnWj3jj499lnFckfCI= golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20200622213623-75b288015ac9/go.mod h1:LzIPMQfyMNhhGPhUkYOs5KpL4U8rLKemX1yGLhDgUto= golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20201124201722-c8d3bf9c5392/go.mod h1:jdWPYTVW3xRLrWPugEBEK3UY2ZEsg3UU495nc5E+M+I= -golang.org/x/crypto v0.44.0 h1:A97SsFvM3AIwEEmTBiaxPPTYpDC47w720rdiiUvgoAU= -golang.org/x/crypto v0.44.0/go.mod h1:013i+Nw79BMiQiMsOPcVCB5ZIJbYkerPrGnOa00tvmc= +golang.org/x/crypto v0.45.0 h1:jMBrvKuj23MTlT0bQEOBcAE0mjg8mK9RXFhRH6nyF3Q= +golang.org/x/crypto v0.45.0/go.mod h1:XTGrrkGJve7CYK7J8PEww4aY7gM3qMCElcJQ8n8JdX4= golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20190121172915-509febef88a4/go.mod h1:CJ0aWSM057203Lf6IL+f9T1iT9GByDxfZKAQTCR3kQA= golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20250911091902-df9299821621 h1:2id6c1/gto0kaHYyrixvknJ8tUK/Qs5IsmBtrc+FtgU= golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20250911091902-df9299821621/go.mod h1:TwQYMMnGpvZyc+JpB/UAuTNIsVJifOlSkrZkhcvpVUk= diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go index a035956fcc..47a07539d9 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go @@ -1490,6 +1490,7 @@ type openSSHEncryptedPrivateKey struct { NumKeys uint32 PubKey []byte PrivKeyBlock []byte + Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` } type openSSHPrivateKey struct { diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/ssh_gss.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/ssh_gss.go index 24bd7c8e83..a6249a1227 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/ssh_gss.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/ssh_gss.go @@ -106,6 +106,13 @@ func parseGSSAPIPayload(payload []byte) (*userAuthRequestGSSAPI, error) { if !ok { return nil, errors.New("parse uint32 failed") } + // Each ASN.1 encoded OID must have a minimum + // of 2 bytes; 64 maximum mechanisms is an + // arbitrary, but reasonable ceiling. + const maxMechs = 64 + if n > maxMechs || int(n)*2 > len(rest) { + return nil, errors.New("invalid mechanism count") + } s := &userAuthRequestGSSAPI{ N: n, OIDS: make([]asn1.ObjectIdentifier, n), @@ -122,7 +129,6 @@ func parseGSSAPIPayload(payload []byte) (*userAuthRequestGSSAPI, error) { if rest, err = asn1.Unmarshal(desiredMech, &s.OIDS[i]); err != nil { return nil, err } - } return s, nil } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/streamlocal.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/streamlocal.go index b171b330bc..152470fcb7 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/streamlocal.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/streamlocal.go @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ func (c *Client) ListenUnix(socketPath string) (net.Listener, error) { if !ok { return nil, errors.New("ssh: streamlocal-forward@openssh.com request denied by peer") } - ch := c.forwards.add(&net.UnixAddr{Name: socketPath, Net: "unix"}) + ch := c.forwards.add("unix", socketPath) return &unixListener{socketPath, c, ch}, nil } @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ func (l *unixListener) Accept() (net.Conn, error) { // Close closes the listener. func (l *unixListener) Close() error { // this also closes the listener. - l.conn.forwards.remove(&net.UnixAddr{Name: l.socketPath, Net: "unix"}) + l.conn.forwards.remove("unix", l.socketPath) m := streamLocalChannelForwardMsg{ l.socketPath, } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/tcpip.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/tcpip.go index 93d844f035..78c41fe5a1 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/tcpip.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/tcpip.go @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import ( "io" "math/rand" "net" + "net/netip" "strconv" "strings" "sync" @@ -22,14 +23,21 @@ import ( // the returned net.Listener. The listener must be serviced, or the // SSH connection may hang. // N must be "tcp", "tcp4", "tcp6", or "unix". +// +// If the address is a hostname, it is sent to the remote peer as-is, without +// being resolved locally, and the Listener Addr method will return a zero IP. func (c *Client) Listen(n, addr string) (net.Listener, error) { switch n { case "tcp", "tcp4", "tcp6": - laddr, err := net.ResolveTCPAddr(n, addr) + host, portStr, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr) if err != nil { return nil, err } - return c.ListenTCP(laddr) + port, err := strconv.ParseInt(portStr, 10, 32) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return c.listenTCPInternal(host, int(port)) case "unix": return c.ListenUnix(addr) default: @@ -102,15 +110,24 @@ func (c *Client) handleForwards() { // ListenTCP requests the remote peer open a listening socket // on laddr. Incoming connections will be available by calling // Accept on the returned net.Listener. +// +// ListenTCP accepts an IP address, to provide a hostname use [Client.Listen] +// with "tcp", "tcp4", or "tcp6" network instead. func (c *Client) ListenTCP(laddr *net.TCPAddr) (net.Listener, error) { c.handleForwardsOnce.Do(c.handleForwards) if laddr.Port == 0 && isBrokenOpenSSHVersion(string(c.ServerVersion())) { return c.autoPortListenWorkaround(laddr) } + return c.listenTCPInternal(laddr.IP.String(), laddr.Port) +} + +func (c *Client) listenTCPInternal(host string, port int) (net.Listener, error) { + c.handleForwardsOnce.Do(c.handleForwards) + m := channelForwardMsg{ - laddr.IP.String(), - uint32(laddr.Port), + host, + uint32(port), } // send message ok, resp, err := c.SendRequest("tcpip-forward", true, Marshal(&m)) @@ -123,20 +140,33 @@ func (c *Client) ListenTCP(laddr *net.TCPAddr) (net.Listener, error) { // If the original port was 0, then the remote side will // supply a real port number in the response. - if laddr.Port == 0 { + if port == 0 { var p struct { Port uint32 } if err := Unmarshal(resp, &p); err != nil { return nil, err } - laddr.Port = int(p.Port) + port = int(p.Port) } + // Construct a local address placeholder for the remote listener. If the + // original host is an IP address, preserve it so that Listener.Addr() + // reports the same IP. If the host is a hostname or cannot be parsed as an + // IP, fall back to IPv4zero. The port field is always set, even if the + // original port was 0, because in that case the remote server will assign + // one, allowing callers to determine which port was selected. + ip := net.IPv4zero + if parsed, err := netip.ParseAddr(host); err == nil { + ip = net.IP(parsed.AsSlice()) + } + laddr := &net.TCPAddr{ + IP: ip, + Port: port, + } + addr := net.JoinHostPort(host, strconv.FormatInt(int64(port), 10)) + ch := c.forwards.add("tcp", addr) - // Register this forward, using the port number we obtained. - ch := c.forwards.add(laddr) - - return &tcpListener{laddr, c, ch}, nil + return &tcpListener{laddr, addr, c, ch}, nil } // forwardList stores a mapping between remote @@ -149,8 +179,9 @@ type forwardList struct { // forwardEntry represents an established mapping of a laddr on a // remote ssh server to a channel connected to a tcpListener. type forwardEntry struct { - laddr net.Addr - c chan forward + addr string // host:port or socket path + network string // tcp or unix + c chan forward } // forward represents an incoming forwarded tcpip connection. The @@ -161,12 +192,13 @@ type forward struct { raddr net.Addr // the raddr of the incoming connection } -func (l *forwardList) add(addr net.Addr) chan forward { +func (l *forwardList) add(n, addr string) chan forward { l.Lock() defer l.Unlock() f := forwardEntry{ - laddr: addr, - c: make(chan forward, 1), + addr: addr, + network: n, + c: make(chan forward, 1), } l.entries = append(l.entries, f) return f.c @@ -185,19 +217,20 @@ func parseTCPAddr(addr string, port uint32) (*net.TCPAddr, error) { if port == 0 || port > 65535 { return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: port number out of range: %d", port) } - ip := net.ParseIP(string(addr)) - if ip == nil { + ip, err := netip.ParseAddr(addr) + if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: cannot parse IP address %q", addr) } - return &net.TCPAddr{IP: ip, Port: int(port)}, nil + return &net.TCPAddr{IP: net.IP(ip.AsSlice()), Port: int(port)}, nil } func (l *forwardList) handleChannels(in <-chan NewChannel) { for ch := range in { var ( - laddr net.Addr - raddr net.Addr - err error + addr string + network string + raddr net.Addr + err error ) switch channelType := ch.ChannelType(); channelType { case "forwarded-tcpip": @@ -207,40 +240,34 @@ func (l *forwardList) handleChannels(in <-chan NewChannel) { continue } - // RFC 4254 section 7.2 specifies that incoming - // addresses should list the address, in string - // format. It is implied that this should be an IP - // address, as it would be impossible to connect to it - // otherwise. - laddr, err = parseTCPAddr(payload.Addr, payload.Port) - if err != nil { - ch.Reject(ConnectionFailed, err.Error()) - continue - } + // RFC 4254 section 7.2 specifies that incoming addresses should + // list the address that was connected, in string format. It is the + // same address used in the tcpip-forward request. The originator + // address is an IP address instead. + addr = net.JoinHostPort(payload.Addr, strconv.FormatUint(uint64(payload.Port), 10)) + raddr, err = parseTCPAddr(payload.OriginAddr, payload.OriginPort) if err != nil { ch.Reject(ConnectionFailed, err.Error()) continue } - + network = "tcp" case "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com": var payload forwardedStreamLocalPayload if err = Unmarshal(ch.ExtraData(), &payload); err != nil { ch.Reject(ConnectionFailed, "could not parse forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com payload: "+err.Error()) continue } - laddr = &net.UnixAddr{ - Name: payload.SocketPath, - Net: "unix", - } + addr = payload.SocketPath raddr = &net.UnixAddr{ Name: "@", Net: "unix", } + network = "unix" default: panic(fmt.Errorf("ssh: unknown channel type %s", channelType)) } - if ok := l.forward(laddr, raddr, ch); !ok { + if ok := l.forward(network, addr, raddr, ch); !ok { // Section 7.2, implementations MUST reject spurious incoming // connections. ch.Reject(Prohibited, "no forward for address") @@ -252,11 +279,11 @@ func (l *forwardList) handleChannels(in <-chan NewChannel) { // remove removes the forward entry, and the channel feeding its // listener. -func (l *forwardList) remove(addr net.Addr) { +func (l *forwardList) remove(n, addr string) { l.Lock() defer l.Unlock() for i, f := range l.entries { - if addr.Network() == f.laddr.Network() && addr.String() == f.laddr.String() { + if n == f.network && addr == f.addr { l.entries = append(l.entries[:i], l.entries[i+1:]...) close(f.c) return @@ -274,11 +301,11 @@ func (l *forwardList) closeAll() { l.entries = nil } -func (l *forwardList) forward(laddr, raddr net.Addr, ch NewChannel) bool { +func (l *forwardList) forward(n, addr string, raddr net.Addr, ch NewChannel) bool { l.Lock() defer l.Unlock() for _, f := range l.entries { - if laddr.Network() == f.laddr.Network() && laddr.String() == f.laddr.String() { + if n == f.network && addr == f.addr { f.c <- forward{newCh: ch, raddr: raddr} return true } @@ -288,6 +315,7 @@ func (l *forwardList) forward(laddr, raddr net.Addr, ch NewChannel) bool { type tcpListener struct { laddr *net.TCPAddr + addr string conn *Client in <-chan forward @@ -314,13 +342,21 @@ func (l *tcpListener) Accept() (net.Conn, error) { // Close closes the listener. func (l *tcpListener) Close() error { + host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(l.addr) + if err != nil { + return err + } + rport, err := strconv.ParseUint(port, 10, 32) + if err != nil { + return err + } m := channelForwardMsg{ - l.laddr.IP.String(), - uint32(l.laddr.Port), + host, + uint32(rport), } // this also closes the listener. - l.conn.forwards.remove(l.laddr) + l.conn.forwards.remove("tcp", l.addr) ok, _, err := l.conn.SendRequest("cancel-tcpip-forward", true, Marshal(&m)) if err == nil && !ok { err = errors.New("ssh: cancel-tcpip-forward failed") diff --git a/vendor/modules.txt b/vendor/modules.txt index f5cc54273e..779f73bdcf 100644 --- a/vendor/modules.txt +++ b/vendor/modules.txt @@ -1553,7 +1553,7 @@ go.uber.org/zap/zapcore # go.yaml.in/yaml/v2 v2.4.3 ## explicit; go 1.15 go.yaml.in/yaml/v2 -# golang.org/x/crypto v0.44.0 +# golang.org/x/crypto v0.45.0 ## explicit; go 1.24.0 golang.org/x/crypto/argon2 golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b